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2. 
by the terms of the contract bet\o~een the producer and 
customer, if fot1nd by the Commission to be just and reasonable, 
rather than by the fluctuating area rates for new gas now -
or hereafter established by the Commission. In addition, in 
certificating the contract sale, the C~mmission will simultaneously 
authorize the producer to abandon the interstate service at 
the conclusion of the contract term. CADC (Robb) generally 
upheld this optional procedure, finding it consistent \dth 
the requirements of the Natural Gas Act . If. held, hcrv1ever, 
that the provision allowing the Commission to approve abandon-
ment at the end of the contract tenn is inconnistent with 
Section 7(b) of the Act, 15 u.s.c . § 717f(b) . The FPC seeks 
certiorari, asking the Court to reverse this aspect of CADC's 
* dec is io·r l . 
2. Facts and Decision Below: Producers of natural 
gas are required , under § 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act , to 
obtain from the FPC certificates of public convenience and 
necessity for sales of natural gas to pipelines or other 
customers in interstate markets . Once having obtained such 
* Respondents urge that the abandonment aspect of CADC's 
decision cannot be considered in isolation from that Court's ruling~ 
on other aspects of · the optional procedure . They have, therefore, 
filed a petition, No . 74-1045, challenging those parts of CADC's 
decision upholding the optional procedure . That petition, however, 
i s made contingent on the Court's granting the FPC's petition . 
"-...-· 
3 . 
certificates, the prices at which the producers may sell their 
gas are governed by area rates (i.~., those applicable to all 
producers in a defined production area) established by the 
Commission as "just and reasonable" under § 4 of the Natural 
Gas Pet. The area rates are, in effect, price ceilimgs: the 
producer may not charge more than the area rate, although he 
may contract with specific customers to sell for less. Moreover, 
if the Comn1ission retroactively adjusts the area rate applicable 
to specific sales downward, the producer may be require~ to 
refund the difference to his customers. Finally, once the 
producer is certificated to sell interstate, he may not ------ -----
abandon such service unless the Commission finds, under § 7(b) 
~------------~--------~------------------
. of the Act, that abandonment is consistent with the public 
convenience and necessity . _______..... 
-
On August . . 3, 1972, the Commission, after follm-1ing ·----t he requisite procedure for rulemaking, issued .Order No . 455, 
amending its rules to establ'ish an "optional procedure for 
certificating new producer sales of natural gas" in interstate 
markets. The Commission found that because of lengthy 
appellate review and the 




by the Commission. Hence producers were reluctant to dedicate 
~
newly discovered gas reserves to the interstate market, rather 
than the unregulated intrastate market, or to incur the heavy 
·. 
:· 
investment n~cessary to the discovery and development of 
.
1 
new gas supplies. The optional procedure is, according to 
the Commission, designed to alleviate the uncertainty and 
the interstate gas shortage to which tt has contributed. 
Under the optional procedure, producers may tender 
for the Corrmission's approval contracts for the sale of new 
~ 
natural gas <!·~·, gas not previously dedicated to the 
4. 
interstate market) at rates that may exceed the -maximum 
authorized by the applicable area rate order. The Commission 
may then determine in a single proceeding whether the public 
convenience and necessity, under § 7(c) of the Act, ·warrants 
certification of the sale and whether the rates set in the 
¢ontract, including definite increments in the rates during 
the contract's life, are "just and reasonable" as required 
by§ 4(a). If the certificate is issued and accepted by the 
producer, it is not subject to change in later proceedings under ---§ 4, and the rates may be collected without risk of refund --- ----------------
obligations. The Commission could, however, at some future ttme, --
use its § 5 power to change the contract rates prospectively. 
Moreover, when it issues ~he certificate, the 
~ 
Commission may, at the same time, authorize the producer to 
~
abandon the sale at the end of the contract term, if 
authorization of such future abandonment is found, under§ 7(b), 
to be consistent with the public convenience and necessity. If 
•. 
5. 
such authorization is given, the producer would be free when 
the contract expirea to withdraw the gas from interstate commerce 
without h.:tving to demonstrate again that abandorunent is consistent 
with the public convenience and necessity. Pre-granted 
abandomnent authority thus would give a producer assurance 
that his present sale will not indefinitely commit the gas to 
what may be a lower-priced interstate market. 
In return for the rate certainty (and, in same cases, 
abandonment assurance) made possible by Order No. 455, a 
producer who accepts a permanent certificate issued under the 
order "'t'laive [ s] all rights to seek future rate increases under 
Section 4 * * *, other than price escalations" called for by 
the contract and certificated by the Commission. In ad(ation, 
the contract may not contain certain indefinite price escalation 
clauses, and the producer who accepts a permanent certificate 
waives his right to benefit from any contingent escalations 
of the price of flowing gas provided for under the applicable 
area rate order . 
The Court of Appeals upheld the optional procedure in 
----------------------~----------------------------
all respects -save that relating to the power to grant abandonment 
-~ - -- - - - -~----
~uthority simultaneous! r with certification .~~' first, 
that, in issuing the order, the Commission had complied with 
the Administrative Procedure Act's rulemaking requirements. 
Second it held that the optional procedure did not amount to 
deregulation of the field ma'rket in natural gas, since the 
contract rates would be judged by the "just and reasonable" 
6. 
standard of § 4, th~ Commission's judgment would be subject 
to judicial review, and the Commission would remain able, 
under § 5, to lo~>1er the contract rates prospectively. Third , 
CADC ruled that advance approval of definite escalations 
in rates established in the contracts would not violate 
§ 4(e) of the Act, which requires that increases in rates be 
preceded by 30 days notice to the Commission and the public. 
The Court stated that, before any fixed contract escalation 
went into effect, the producer would have to provide the 
notice that § 4 (e) requires . Moreover, the Commission. could 
use its § 5 power to disapprove the escalation. 'I'he Court 
agreed with chailengers to .the order that it might be difficul t 
for the Commission to judge, long in advance of their effectiY~ 
date, that a contract's fixed escalations in rates would b3 
just and reasonable . But, the Court stated, this problem 
was a matter of proof , and such a judgment might be possible 
in some cases even though it would not be in others . The 
Court concluded, therefore, that the procedure was not, as 
an abstract matter, necessarily inconsistent with § 4 in all 
conceivable applications. 
Fourth, CADC held that the order's exemption of producers 
certificated under it from any refund obligations did not 
violate § 4(e) , since that section provides only that the 
Commission may order refunds, not that it must do so in all 
cases. Fifth, the Court held that cAne was not imperntisaibl) 
discriminating among producers in re'quiring that those 
\·:) 
';•.' 







certificated under the option~l procedure waive all rights to 
the contingent escalations in. new gas rates provided in aren 
rate orders. The dontingent escalations, designed to stimullltc 
the volume of interstate dedications, were integral parts of 
the area rate system of incentives, and had no application 
to producers choosing the inducements of the optinal procedure . 
Sixth, the Court ruled that the Commission's refusal to approve 
indefinite rate escalations in contracts (~·&·,rate increaseg 
in area rates) was not arbitrary, since the whole purpose of 
the new program '"as to provide certainty by means of exemption. 
from the :: area rates, and not to give producers a chance to tak~ 
advantage of increases in the area rates while irnmunb;ing thi.~r,l 
from decreases. 
Finally, the court . -~urned to that aspect of the optional -procedure allowing the Commission, in granting certification, 
-------------------
simultaneously to approve abandonment of the sale at the 
-----.---..__.~----------. ---·- -· -- - ·-- - - -
conclusion of the contract term. The court held such pregrants -----
abandonment inconsistent with § 7(b) of the Act . That section 
·- - -··"--provides: 
N~JllL£...Qrr!~ shall abandon all or 
any portion of its facilitles-9ubjact to the juria-
diction of the Commission, or an_y sc!rvice rendered 
by means of such facilities, witfiout the-permission 
and approval of the Commission~irst had and ootuined, 
affi~~nrinding by the Commission 
that the available supply of natural gas is depleted 
to the extent that the continuance of service is 
unl'larrnnted, or that the presm.lt or future public 




3. CONTENTIONS: The SG argues that CADC's decision on 
pregranted abbndonment conflicts with CAlO's decision in 
Sunray Oil Co. v. ffQ, 239 F. 2d 97, reversed on other grounds 
353 U.S. 944 (hereinafter, Sunray I) and also this Court ' s 
decision in Sunray II, 364 u.s. 137, cited by CADC. In 
Sunray I, the Connnission had refused to issue a § 7 certificflt(> 
limited in duration, contending that § 7(b) required it to 
issue only unlimited certificates. CAlO disagreed, holding 
') that the Commission did have pm>1er to limit certificates to 
. fb·:ed periods. Subsequently, in Sunray .,.:.II,- CAlO held that w1Lil. 
the Commission has authority to issue limited term ccrtificet('f:S) 
it also has authority to issue a certificate unlimited in tim~, 
even though the producer has applied for only a limited term 
certificate. This Court affirmed . But in so doing, it did not~ 
as CADC erroneously thought, disapprove limited term cert:i.fic,::~t 
On the contrary, the Court stated that there ~.:ras "no contention 
that the Commission was again indulging in the erroneous 
notion that it had no power to issue a limited certificate." 
Thus the Court, in Sunray II, held only that the Commission 
had power to require permanent certificates, -not that limited 
t erm certificates are precluded . 
The ' SG contends that CADC ' s disapproval of pregranted 
abandonment is not required by § 7 (b). Nothing in that 
(/..£;J 
section requires that the Commission's judgment~to the effects 
of the abandonment cannot be made in advance of the time the 
abandonment is to occur . Moreover , in making its § 7(b) 
10. 
judgment, the Commission can properly take into account the 
public need for gas prior to the proposed termination date, 
and whether a promise that the producer will be allowed to 
abandon will help in meeting that need. 
Finally the SG argues that CADC's disapproval of 
pregranted abandonment will seriously impair the viability 
of the optional procedure and, hence, the Commission's ability 
to deal with the interstate gas shortage. The SG says that, 
~--
since CADC is clearly wrong, this is an appropriate candidate 
for summary reversal. 
· In their responses, the challengers to the optional 
procedure generally rely on CADC's decision on this point. 
They also argue that the pregranted abandonment problem 
cannot be considered in isolation from other aspects of the 
optional procedure. Therefore, if the Court grants this 
petition, it should also grant the challengers' contingent 
cross-petition. 
4. Discussion: This does not seem a proper candidate 
for summary reversal. It 'is true that, in Sunray II, this Court 
appears to have assumed that limited term certificates and 
pregranted abandonments are equivalent, and to have said, 
in dictum, that the Commission has power, despite§ 7(b}, 
~ 
to grant such certificates. But, despite this ass1~tion, there 
is at least a theoretical difference between pregranted 
abandonment, contemplated by the FPC here, and the kind of 
., •. 
•. . : 
,. . ' ' ... 
. ' 
11. 
limited term certification held within the FPC's power by 
CA 10 in Sunray ~ and apparently approved by the Court in 
Sunray II. Ltmited term certification means that the 
producer will be required, at the conclusion of the term, 
to demonstrate that the public convenience and necessity 
requires his continued participation in the interstate market. 
But it does not necessarily mean that such a producer can, at 
the end of th~ term, unilaterally cease selling interstate, 
without the Commission's permission under§ 7(b}~ In other 
words, a producer with a limited term certificate could be 
required to demonstrate that the public interest either does 
or does not require continued interstate sales, and the 
Commission might be able to order him to continue selling 
interstate if it finds that the public convenience and 
necessity so requires. Pregranted abandonment, however, means 
that the Commission has already decided that. at the end of 
the contract term the producers continued sales interstate 
will be unnecessary to the public interest . 
In fact, the court in Sunray II seems to have left "-open the question whether pregranted abandonment would be 
consistent with§ 7(b)'s requirement: 
---------~~¥n~a~ly it is suggested that for various 
J:"easona ~1hich petitioner claims to be related to 
the public interest, it would be more advantageous 
if gas producers were given a free hand, after 
the completion of each cont:~;act, to determine for 
themselves \-Jhethcr they shollld continue to serve 
the interstate market. These considerations were 
not urged before the Cmumission, and hence we are 
"----' 
,_ 
not called upon to decide whether they would 
compel a different approach by the Conunission 
to the queotion of ttme limitations in 
certificates, or even whether, in the light of 
the Act's provisions - particularly the policy 
expressed in § 7(b) - it would be proper for 
it so to rely on them." 
364 u.s. at 158. Moreover, the Sunrax II opinion, as CADC 
noted, described at length the reasons why pregranted 
abandonment may be contrary to the public interest. 
12. 
It is not clear, however, that § 7(b) compels CADC's 
result. The possibility of pregranted abandonment is 
almost certainly a significant incentive to producers to use 
the Commission's optional procedure and, as the SG argues, 
its diGapproval by CADC seems likely to reduce the procedure'o 
effectiveness. Finally, CADC dealt in this case with a rule, 
which stated only that the Commission would, in appropriate 
cases, grant abandonment simultaneously with certification. 
CADC's holding on this point thus meant that in~ case, 
however short the contract term, could pregranted abandonment 
be consistent with the Commission's obligations under§ 7(b). 
This holding that § 7(b) absolutely precludes pregranted 
abandonment, whatever the facts of a particular case, seems 
highly questionable. 
I recommend that the petition be granted. 
There is a response. 
February 26, 1975 
.. . . ~
. . ( 
.. ··-
Carr CADC opn in petn app 
'• 
March 14, 1975 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 5 
No. 74-883 
FEDERAL POWER COMM1 N 
MOSS 
Motion for Leave to File An 
Amicus Brief Urging Grant 
G-
The petn of the FPC is listed at page 3 of this Conference list. The Inter state 
Natural Gas Assoc. of America seeks leave to file an amicus brief supporting the 
FPC 1 s petn for cert. INGAA' s motion was filed February 20. 
INGAA1 s members include most of the natural gas transmission companies 
subject to the jurisdiction of the FPC. The association is concerned that the decision 
below if affirmed could eliminate a significant source of natural gas for the interstate 
market which the pipeline companies urgently need in order to minimize curtailments 
in service to their customers. INGAA argues that the decision below, insofar as it 
declared unlawful the pre-granted abandorunent provision of Commission Order No. 
is in conflict with precedent of this Court and with decisions of CA 101 Sunray Mia-
Continental Oil Co. v. FPC 1 364 U.S. 137; Sun Oil Co~ v. FPC, 364 U.S. 1701 which 
' 
held that the FPC has the power under the Natural Gas Act to grant limited-term 
certificates of public convenience and necessity. 
DISCUSSION: Rule 42(1) provides in pertinent part: 
3/4/75 
PJN 
A brief of an amicus curiae prior to consideration ••• 
of the petition for writ of certiorari1 filed with ••• a 
motion for leave to file when consent is refused1 may 
be filed only if submitted a reasonable time prior to 
the consideration of ••• the petition. • • Such motions 
are not favored. 
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List 3, Sheet I 
No. 74-1045 
MOSS, ET AL. 
v. 
FEDERAL POWEJ.~ COMMISSION 
Cert to CA DC 
(Tamm, MacKinnon, Robb) 
Federal/ Civil Time Question':' 
1. SUM1v1 A~s_~_: The FPC adopted a new certificating procedure which allowed 
'\._../ ,;. 1 CA DC c nte red J udgmc nt on August 15, 1974, and denied petitions for rehearing on Sept em· 
7 
- ber 19, 1974. The Chief Justice granted the FPC an extension until January 17, 1975, and 
the f)(j filect on th at date . Petrs herein, resps in No. 74-883, did not request an extension , 
but filed this conditional eros s -petition on February 20, 1975- -apparently jurisdictionally 
out of time. 
Petrs contend th a t the nee d for this petition did not arise until the SG had sought cert in 
No. 74-883. Wh e n that occurred, petrs argue, they recognized that the issue raised by th t 
SG 1s petition could not ''tneaningfully be considered in isolation from the other issues deci c 
ed contempor aneously by 11 CADC. This petition was filed 33 days after the SG's. 
In at least 1 wu cas es th e Court has taken untimely conditional eros s -petitions. Brotherhoa 
of_ R_a i]~~Cl erks v. Florida East Coas t Railway Co., 382 U.S. 1008, 384 U.S. 239, 243; 
Pi e rsc'l2 v. Ray, 384 U.S. 938, 386 U.S. 547, 551. According. to Stern & Gressman the 
ration a l e i s th ;<t th e Court's jurisdiction over the whole case attaches when the first peti-
tinn is timely fiJ e d, thus any other party may file an additional petition involving the same 
j\l <:gm<"nt. Stern & Grc s sman, at 311-12. The rationale makes some sense; however, the 
wo1.·din g of 28 USC 210 l (c) does not se elll to support such an exception, and petrs present 
no excusC' for lH't timely filing this conditional petition as a precaution. If the Court grant: 






natural gas producers to avoid some of the drawbacks of the 11 area rate 11 method. CA DC 
approved all but one part of the procedure and the SG, sought cert in No. 74-883 requ estin g 
a summary reversal on that one issue. The challengers to the new procedure, petrs h e rein 
and resps in No. 74-883, argue in this conditional cross-petition that the entire procedure 
must be reviewed if the SG 1 s petition is granted. 
I 
2. FACTS: A complete explanation of the new procedure, and the CA DC decision, 
is presented in the preliminary memo for No. 74-883. Basically, the new procedure allo'A'E 
producers to avoid certain drawbacks presented by FPC area rates --geographical price 
ceilings--and thereby encourages producers to dedicate newly available natural gas to the 
interstate market as opposed to unregulated intrastate markets. Under the new procedure 
producers subm.it individual long-term contracts to the FPC for approval; the contracts 
provide for the sale of 11 new 11 gas at prices which may exceed the area rate, and although 
the FPC could use its §5 power to change the contract rates prospectively, once a certifi-
cate is granted a producer need not fear a refund order if the area rates decrease. In 
return for rate certainty, including definite increments during the life of the contract, the 
producer waives the §4 right to seek future rate increases and to benefit from any contin-
gent escalations of the area rate. 
CA DC found this much of the procedure conformed with the Natural Gas Act, 15 
USC 717; however, the court held that at the time it is sues the certificate the FPC may not 
grant producers the right to abandon the sale at the end of the c;:ontract term. Section 7(b) 
of the Act, 15 USC 717£(b), requires a hearing and a finding of public convenience and 
necessity before the FPC allows abandonment of any service, and CA DC concluded that 
"pre granted abandonment requires more clairvoyance than even the Commission's expe r-
tise reasonably encompasses. 11 
3. CONTENTIONS: In No. 74-833 the SG seeks to salvage pregranted abandonmen 




t• because the viability of the new procedure will be s~riously impaired by the CA DC rulin g . 
Petrs conditionally seek to bring the rest of the judgment into questi o n. They 
single out the provision under the new procedure that in s ures a producer that. o nc e a 
certifica~e is issued no refunds will be required if the area rate drops. Petrs c1ai.m 
this provision violates the statutory purpose of assuring 11 consumers a complete, pern u -
nent and effective bond of protection from excessive rates and charges." Atlantic Ref1ni n g 
Co. v . Public Service Com0ission, 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959). 
Petrs claim the 11more important question 11 raised here 1s whether the Court r.f 
Appeals can continue to allow novel procedures which give producers higher than just ;-.. nd-
reasonable prices . during the pendency of review proceedings. Petrs claim that FPC :c1.n d 
CA approval of escape hatches like this new procedure undercuts the area rate ancl s • , <~ ­
how forces it continually upward. 
4/ DISCUSSION: Whatever loosening of the jurisdictional requirements tlL · 
allowed for an untimely conditional cross petition should be contingent upon prese1 
J. y be 
\ ' 11 
of a strong argument for considering the untimely issues. Obviously, no such argu1 ·."1t is 
presented here. Petrs fail to state why the pregranted abandonment issue is not eli --- rde 
from the rest of the new certification procedure. The pregranted abandonment ma~ c ••.r 
seems me rely to be a question of comparing that practice with § 7 and the Court ' s l-' , . n us 
cases on abandonment. E. ·g., Sunray Oil v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137. Moreover, a c .; n L!j l< l:•' 
review at this time of the new certification procedure may be premature, and ma 1 1 . ,,,_ rict 
the FPC's attempts to define new ways to deal with energy problems. 
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Mo1 ~ "> n to Dispense with 
Printing An Appendix 
The SG moves pursuant to Rule 36(8) for leave to dispense with the 
requirement of a separate appendix as otherwise required by Rule 36. He 
t 
states that the parties have agreed that the only items in the record that need 
be separately printed are those that are already reproduced in the appendix to 
the cert petition. He also advises that the parties may in addition refer in their 
briefs to any other items that are part of the originaJ record. 
DISCUSSION: This appears to be a routine motion to dispense with 
printing an appendix. The appendix at the back of the cert petition contains 
the CA opinion., judgment ann order denying a reh earing 1 the pertinent FI~C 
' .. 
' '~ . 
• • l ··~ 
(\......;, 
,. 
orders and the statutory authority. The parties reservation of the option to 
refer to ''any other items that are part of the original record" does not 
necessarily conflict with the Rule 36(1) requirement that the appendix contain 
11 (4) any other parts of the record to which the parties wish to direct the court 1 s 
particular attention. 11 
8/6/75 
PJN 
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No. 74-883 
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MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opm10n of the 
Court. 
Section 7 (b) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S. C.§ 717f 
(b), provides that "[n] o natural-gas company shall 
abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the 
jurisdiction of the [Federal Power] Commission, or any 
service rendered by means of such facilities, without the 
permission and approval of the Commission first had and 
obtained, after due hearing, and a finding by the Com-
mission . .. that the present or future public convenience 
or necessity permit such abandonment." 1 The question 
presented in this case is whether FPC may, upon a 
proper finding of public convenience or necessity, simul-
taneously authorize both the sale of natural gas in inter-
state commerce by a producer and the abandonment of 
"Section 7 (b) of the Act provides in full text : 
"No natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its 
facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any 
service rendered by means of such facilities, without the permission 
and approval of the Commission first had and obtained, after due 
hearing, and a finding by the Commission that the available supply 
of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the continuance of 
service is unwarranted, or that the present or future public con-
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the sale at a future date certain. The Court of Appeala 
for the District of Columbia Circuit construed § 7 (b) to 
empower FPC to authorize abandonment only when 
and if proposed at the end of the contract term, thus 
precluding power to authorize abandonment simultane-
ously with certificating new producer sales. Accordingly, 
the Court of Appeals set aside the FPC order involved 
in this case insofar as it permits the Commission, at the 
time it issues a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity, to authorize the producer to terminate the 
sale at the end of the contract term. 502 F. 2d 461 
(1974). We granted certiorari. 422 U. S. 1066 (1975). 
We reverse. 
I 
FPC Order No. 455, 48 F. P. C. 218, issued August 3, 
1972, is the order involved. The Order was promulgated 
under FPC rulemaking authority pursuant to a notice of 
April 6, 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 7345, as an addition to FPC's 
general rules of practice and procedure, 18 CFR § 2.75 
(1975). Order No. 455 established an "optional proce-
dure for certificating new producer sales of natural gas." 
48 F . P. C., at 218. The new procedure did not displace 
area pricing, but instead provided an alternative to "stim-
ulate and accelerate domestic exploration and develop-
ment of natural gas reserves." I d. , at 225. The proce-
dure was necessary, the Commission found, because 
natural gas producers were frequently unable, due to 
hazards of area price revisions in lengthy appellate review 
proceedings, to rely upon rates established by FPC in its 
area rate orders, and thus were discouraged from explor-
ing for new gas and committing it to the interstate mar-
ket. For "there is no assurance at the present time that. 
a producer may not ultimately have to refund some of an 
initial rate .. . upon which the producer relied when it. 
dedicated a new gas supply to the interstate market."' 
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I d., at 222-223. "[T]he producer does not know ... how 
much it will get if it develops and sells new gas to the 
interstate market. The producer knows for sure only 
that once it sells in interstate commerce it cannot stop 
deliveries." /d., at 223. "This uncertainty," the Com-
mission found, "has impeded exploration and develop-
ment." Ibid. 
The optional procedure introduced by Order No. 455 
was designed to "lessen rate uncertainty which has pre-
vailed since the early 1960's." /d., at 219. The pro-
cedure has several features. First, it permits producers 
to tender for FPC approval contracts for the sale of new 
natural gas 2 at rates that may exceed the maximum 
authorized by the applicable rate order.8 Second, FPC 
will determine in a single proceeding whether the "public 
convenience and necessity" under § 7 (c) of the Act, 15 
U. S. C. § 717f (c), warrants the issuance of a certificate 
authorizing the sale and whether the rates called for by 
the contract are "just and reasonable" under § 4 (a), 15 
U. S. C. § 717c (a). Third, a permanent certificate is-
sued by the Commission and accepted by the producer 
is not subject to change in later proceedings under § 4 of 
the Act/ 15 U. S. C. § 717c, and the rates may be col-
2 The optional procedure is available for sales of gas produced 
from wells commenced after April 6, 1972, and gas that has not 
previously been sold in interstate commerce. 18 CFR § 2.75 (b) (5) 
(1975) . 
3 After adoption of the optional procedure, FPC established 
a national ceiling rate for some sales of natural gas. Order No. 699, 
-F. P. C. - (1974) . The optional procedure was then amended 
to permit producers to tender contracts for certification including 
rates exceeding the national ceiling, as well as area rates. Order 
No. 455-B,- F. P. C. - (1974) . 
4 The procedure does not, however, limit the applicability of § 5, 
15 U.S. C. § 717d. See 18 CFR § 2.75 (d) (1975). The Commission 
noted in Order No. 455 that it was unable to "bind a future Com~ 
mission not to invoke the prospective operation of Section 5"; the 
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lected without risk of refund obligations. !d., at 226. 
See 18 CFR § 2.75 (d) (1975). Fourth, Order No. 455 
authorizes inclusion in the permanent certificate of the 
abandonment assurance-or "pregranted abandonment"-
called in question in this case. 18 CFR § 2.75 (e) 
(1975).~ The authority to include assurance that the 
producer may abandon the sale at the end of the con-
tract term is, however, to be exercised only upon appro-
priate findings by FPC of public convenience or necessity, 
as required by§ 7 (b). Order No. 455-A, 48 F. P. C. 477, 
481 (1972) . 
The importance to the producer of the pregranted 
abandonment provision is obvious. Pregranted abandon-
ment gives the producer assurance that his present sale 
will not indefinitely commit the gas to what may be a 
lower-priced interstate market: he will be free on 
the contract expiration date to discontinue deliveries 
to the purchaser without having to demonstrate again 
that abandonment is consistent with the public con-
venience or necessity. 
II 
The entire optional procedure of Order No. 455 was 
attacked in petitions for review before the Court of 
Appeals, which upheld the Order in all respects save the 
pregranted abandonment authority.6 In holding that 
Commissioners further stated that "[t]o the extent that this Com-
mission can grant certainty of rates, we do so." 48 F. P. C., at 223. 
s This provision reads as follows : 
"Applications presented hereunder will be considered for perma-
nent certification, either with or without pregranted abandonment, 
notwithstanding that the contract rate may be in excess of an area· 
ceiling rate established in a prior opinion or order of this 
Commission." 
6 Respondents' cross-petition seeking review of the Court of 
Appeals' decision to the extent that it adversely resolved their 
'COntentions was denied. 422 U. S. 1020 (1975). 
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~ 7 (b) requires a public C<?nV~~ience Of necessity find: 
ing by FPC !1-t the ti~e of the proposed abando~: 
!llent, thus pr.eclufling such !Jn~Fng at ~he ti~~ <?f ce~tifi: 
p~tiop~ the Collfti o(Appeals stated, 5Q2 F . 2d, at '!72; 
"P~egpanteP. !'1-b!'l-n~onment would leave a producer 
fr~e ~q pi§cgntinue service to the interstate market, 
pefh~tps year.s after the original certification, with no 
rontemporaneous obligation on the producer to jus-
tify withdraw~! of service as consistent with the pub .. 
lie convenienc~ ~tnd necessity. We think Section 
7 (b) does not contempl~tte or authorize such 
procedure. 
" . . . It appears to us . . . that pregranted abandon• 
ment requires more clairvoyance than even the Com• 
mission's expertise reasonably encompasses." 
We find nothing on the face of § 7 (b) to support the 
holding that the section "does not contemplate or author .. 
ize such procedure." There is no express provision 
prescribing the timing of the finding of public conven-
ience or necessity that is prerequisite to FPC authority to 
allow the producer to abandon a sale. In the absence 
of an explicit direction, the inference may reasonably be 
made that Congress left the timing of the finding within 
the general discretionary power granted FPC "to regulate 
abandonment of service," S. Rep. No. 1162, 75th Cong., 
1st Sess., 2 (1937); H. R. Rep. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 2 ( 1937) . "[T] he Commission's broad responsi-
bilities . . . demand a generous construction of its statu-
tory authority," Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 
U. S. 747, 776 (1968) , and that inference is plainly con-
sistent with Congress' regulatory goals. 
The reasoning of the Court of Appeals that pregranted 
abandonment requires "clairvoyance" overlooks the ex-
press power granted to FPC in § 7 (b) to allow abandon-
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ment upon a proper finding that the "present or future'' 
public convenience or necessity warrants permission to 
abandon. The power to authorize an abandonment upon 
finding that it is justified by future public convenience or' 
necessity clearly encompasses advance authorization 
warranted by consideration of future circumstances and 
the necessary estimation of tomorrow's needs. That has 
been our conclusion when FPC authority to make fore-
casts of future events has been challenged in other con-
texts. For example, in rejecting the contention that the 
FPC could not consider forecasts of the future under the 
nearly identical standard of § 7 (e) , FPC v. Transcon-
tinental Gas Corp., 365 U. S. 1, 28-29 ( 1961), stated 
that "a forecast of the direction in which the future 
public interest lies necessarily involves deductions based 
on the expert knowledge of the agency." Similarly, as 
to another agency, we have stated our unwillingness to 
let "uncertainties as to the future ... paralyze the [Inter-
state Commerce] Commission into inaction." United 
States v. Detroit & Cleveland Navigation Co., 326 U. S. 
236, 241 (1945) . Thus, to the extent that exercising 
the pregranted abandonment authority entails forecast-
ing future developments affecting supply and demand, 
we cannot say that requiring this degree of "clairvoy-
ance" renders the provision beyond FPC authority. 
Furthermore, FPC may determine that present supply 
and demand conditions require that pregranted abandon-
ment be authorized in appropriate cases to encourage 
exploration for new gas and its dedication to the inter-
state market, since the unwillingness of producers to 
make indefinite commitments has made potentially avail-
able supplies inaccessible to the interstate market. We 
conclude therefore that an optional procedure encom-
passing pregranted authority intended to draw new gas 
.supplies to the interstate market is clearly within FPC. 
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suthority to permit abandonments Justified by either 
yrese:nf or [ut11.re public convenience or necessity.7 
Order No. 455 does not authorize specific abandon-
ments. It merely establishes an optional procedure un-
der· which pregranted abandonment may be authorized 
in appropriate cases. Any pregranted abandonments 
approved under this procedure are subject to judicial 
review under the Act. See § 19 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 717r 
(b). We should not presume, as the Court of Appeals 
did, that the Commission is not competent to make 
proper findings supported by substantial evidence and 
consistent with § 7 (b) in approving pregranted abandon-
ment. Rather, the question whether particular pre-
granted abandonment authorizations are beyond the 
Commission's expertise should await resolution in con-
crete cases. See FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U. S. 380, 392 
(1974).8 It suffices for the purposes of this case that 
" FPC has disclaimed any reliance on the ground, permitted under 
§ 7 (b), that "the available supply of natural gas is depleted to the 
extent that the continuance of service is unwarranted." We there-
fore have no occasion to address the question whether pregranted 
abandonment on that ground would exceed FPC authority. 
8 Paradoxically, similar considerations led the Court of Appeals 
to reject respondents' challenge to a provision of the optional 
procedure requiring the Commission to determine the reasonable-
ness of futtll'e rate escalations included in contracts submitted pur-
suant to the procedure. Yet no attempt was made to distinguish 
the case of future rate escalations from that of pregranted abandon-
ment in this respect. The Court said : 
"We cannot say as an abstract proposition of law that it is im-
possible for the Commission to make an advance determination of 
'reasonableness' in proceedings under Section 4. Although as a 
practical matter one may be skeptical about the ability of the Com-
mission to succeed in this endeavor, we think it may make the 
attempt. Whether it succeeds will depend upon the evidentiary 
basis for the escalations proposed in a given contract and the rea-
sonabfeness of Commission findings and projections supporting and. 
al?prov~ su(lh esCJWations. The q~estion is one of proof which Ca.Ill 
," 
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we read § 7 (b) as leaving the timing of approval oi 
abandonments to FPC discretion.9 
III 
The Court of Appeals stated that its construction oi 
§ 7 (b) as denying FPC authority to authorize abandon-
ment on a future date certain at the time of certification 
was "fortified" by Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC 
(Sunray II), 364 U.S. 137 (1960). Sunray II held that 
FPC had authority to tender a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity without time limitation to a 
producer who applied for a certificate authorizing sales 
for 20 years only. The Co.trt reasoned, id., at 142: 
"If petitioners' contentions as to the want of au-
thority in the Commission to grant a permanent 
certificate where one of limited duration has been 
sought for, were to be sustained, the way would be 
clear for every independent producer of natural gas 
to seek certification only for the limited period of 
its initial contract with the transmission company, 
and thus automatically be free at a future date, 
untrammelled by Commission regulation, to reassess 
whether it desired to continue serving the interstate 
market." 
We understand the Court of Appeals to read this 
passage as implying that a limited-term certificate would 
be barred by the Act, and that a permanent certificate 
with pregranted abandonment would also be barred since 
be answered only on a record setting out a particular proposal and 
the evidence supporting it." 502 F. 2d, at 468. 
9 Respondents claim that the pregranted abandonment provision 
.amounts to deregulation akin to that condemned in FPC v. Texaco, 
Inc., supra, at 400. But, unlike the small-producer exemption in-
volved there, the FPC in the optional procedure retains full control 
-over its regulatory jurisdiction. 
·' 
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such a certificate, as FPC concedes, FPC Brief, at 22, is 
legally and functionally indistinguishable from a limited-
term certificate.10 But the Court of Appeals' reading of 
Sunray II was patently erroneous. Sunray II in fact 
indicated that FPC is authorized to issue limited-term 
certificates. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
had addressed that question at an earlier stage of the 
litigation and had held that FPC was authorized to issue 
such certificates. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 
.-239 F. 2d 97 (1956), rev'd on other grounds, 353 U. S. 
944 (1957) (Sunray /).11 Sunray II implicitly approved 
this holding in stating, 364 U. S., at 157: "There is -no 
contention that the 'Commission was again indulging in 
the erroneous notion that it had no power to issu.e ~a 
limited certificate." 
·Thus, rather than imply that the Act forbids the issu-
ance of a limited-term certificate, Sunray 11 approved 
the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 'Cir-
cuit that the Act permits the issuance of such a certifi-
cate.12 Sunray II therefore supports the conclusion we 
10 The Court of Appeals found that pregranted abandonment has 
"the same potentiality of prejudice to consumers" that tills Court 
was concerned about in Sunray II. 502 F . ' 2d, at 472. In that 
case, however, Sunray's position would have removed FPC discr.e-
tion not to issue limited-term certificates . wherever a produ~r 
sought a limited certificate. Both Sunray 1! and today's · decisiqn 
maintain FPC discretion in this regard, while the Court of Ap-
peals' conclusion reduces FPC's ability to exercise its regulato_ry 
responsibility. · 
11 The first decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit was reversed in Sunray I on the ground that the Court had 
itself decided whether FPC should have issued a limited-term certifi-
cate, rather than remanding to the Commission to resolve tills ques-
tion in the first instance, 353 U. S. 944. ·Sunray II sustained the 
Court of Appeals' later affirmance of FPC's issuance of an unlimi~ed 
.certificate, 267 F. 2d 471 (1959). 
• 12 Moreover. if issuance of limited-term certificates were bari:e<J 
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have reached and does not fortify the Court of Appeals' 
construction of § 7 (b), In both the case of the limited-
term certificate and the case of the permanent certificate 
with pregranted abandonment, FPC determines at the 
time of certification that the present or future public 
convenience or necessity justifies the issuance of a cer-
tificate that allows discontinuance of service at a future 
date certain without need for further proceedings. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed 
insofar as it set aside the pregranted abandonment pro~ 
vision of Order No. 455, and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
MR. JusTICE STEWART, MR. JusTICE PowELL, and MR. 
JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case. 
by the Act, there would have been no need to decide Sunray II. 
In that circumstance the producer could hardly have complained 
that FPC failed to recognize its request for only a limited certifi-
cate, since such a reading of the Act requires FPC in all cases to. 
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